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Abstract 
The current Oslo toll ring system was implemented in 1990 to generate funds for road investments in the larger Oslo area. Currently, 
about 60 % of the toll income is being used for investments and maintenance of public transport.  The use of a large share of toll 
income on public transport may be seen as strategy to induce people to use public transport. However, congestion in peak periods 
is still a major problem in the Oslo area and has attracted public attention. Congestion imposes a major social cost. All else equal, 
congested traffic produces more air pollution, increases travel time and consumes more energy than smooth traffic flow. Given that 
the Oslo toll ring with flat rates is already in place, planners have started to address the question of whether the system in place can 
be converted to a marginal cost-based scheme to reduce the prevalent congestion. In this paper we examine the benefits of 
converting the already existing Oslo toll ring with flat rates to a congestion-based charging scheme. To do so, we first develop a 
theoretical model along the lines of Arnott et al.(1993).  The theoretical model is then combined with a more practical and empirical 
model for estimating the optimal tolls and assessing the effects of a congestion scheme. The findings show that transforming the 
current toll ring system into a congestion-pricing system, where peak traffic is charged a higher toll than off-peak traffic, holds 
great potential for easing traffic congestion and improving the environment. Further, it will improve the efficiency of both public 
and private transport while at the same time it can raise more revenues compared to the current situation. Thus, such a move will 
not be in conflict with the current road financing toll.  These results have direct policy implications in that they should appeal to 
decision-makers and hence are relevant for the marketing of congestion pricing. 
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B. V. 
Peer-review under responsibility of the Association for European Transport. 
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1. Introduction 
Every day thousands of people are waiting in line to get into the city centre of Oslo. Unlike Oslo, London and 
Stockholm have introduced a congestion charge scheme. The result from the Stockholm trial shows that the reduction 
in traffic to and from the city centre was 20-25%. The time spent in the queue went down 30-50%. Furthermore, local 
emissions in the centre went down 14%. (Vingan et al.2007). Is it time to introduce a similar scheme in Oslo? In nearly 
all other operations characterized by peak load problems, at least some attempt is made to differentiate between rates 
for peak and off-peak service. (Vickrey 1963,p.452). Over forty years ago, William Vickrey investigated the possibility 
of introducing congestion charging. He pointed out that congestion charging on the roads should be introduced because 
it was one of the few places where time differentiation based on demand was not implemented. An example is hotels 
that have different prices for high season and low season. Today, forty years later, a congestion charging scheme has 
still not been introduced in Oslo. 
This paper will analyse the significance of congestion charging in Oslo, in the form of a marginal cost-based scheme 
in the existing toll ring. No individuals will benefit from queuing. Queues inflict efficiency loss in society. The damage 
can be reduced by pricing the negative external costs imposed on society. 
By combining two scientific articles, it will be possible to see the connection between the environment and 
congestion. Johansson-Stenman (2006) analyses the environmental costs of queuing, but not during rush hours in 
particular. Arnott et al.(1993) model congestion during rush hour. The environmental costs discussed in the present 
paper will be the costs of standing in line. Other external environmental costs are not taken into account. Since the 
paper aims to analyse the congestion charge, it would not be appropriate to use Johansson-Stenman (2006) as the main 
basis for the model presented here. It will be drawn in later. The work of Arnott et al.(1993) will be used as the basis 
for the present task. 
Arnott et al. (1993) make a detailed analysis of William Vickrey's bottleneck model of the congestion of cars during 
morning rush hour. The environmental problem of cars creating a queue requires measures that affect the behaviour 
of individuals. Neither Arnott et al. (1993) nor  Johansson-Stenman (2006) have introduced measures other than road 
pricing. The environmental problem is central in the current climate debate. Rational individuals without an option to 
drive do not change their behaviour due to a congestion charge. Therefore we introduce public transport in the model 
for elastic demand. Public transport gives individuals an alternative possibility, and the congestion charge can thus 
influence individual behaviour. 
Driving imposes more external costs on society during peak hours. External costs are costs that consumers or 
businesses impose on other actors, and that they do not need to take into account (Ministry of Finance (2003)). It is 
economically desirable to price negative external costs. More queues mean more pollution. If there is a queue, a new 
driver causes even greater delay by driving. This provides two external costs: an environmental cost and a time cost. 
Setting higher toll charges during peak hours can reduce unnecessary pollution, such as reducing the number of cars 
standing in line. Individuals with the greatest willingness to pay for time savings are given the opportunity to reduce 
travel time. Introducing a toll equal to the marginal social cost of driving forces individuals to take into account the 
costs they inflict on others and society. Drivers should base their decision on the social cost, not only the private cost 
that is too low. 
The most important reason for introducing environmental taxes is that taxes can provide an environmental benefit 
in terms of reduced pollution. Cost is a fundamental principle of environmental policy. Cost-effectiveness means that 
a given environmental goal is achieved at the lowest possible cost. The most targeted environmental taxes imply that 
the charge should be laid directly on the environmentally harmful activity. (NOU 2007:8, p.31.) 
An optimal environmental quality is achieved when the value of reducing emissions marginally equals the cost of 
implementing this emission reduction. Ideally, car users should have to pay the marginal cost of local driving. This 
can be done through various systems of road pricing. Road pricing may make it possible to differentiate the tax rates 
in the pricing system between cities, urban areas and sparsely populated areas. (NOU 2007:8, p.31, s.79.) 
If traffic is flowing freely, the marginal queuing cost will be approximately zero. At the times and on the routes 
where congestion occurs, a congestion charge will reduce much of the time loss, increase efficiency and improve 
environmental quality. (Vingan et al. 2007, p.2.) The marginal external cost is the time value of the loss the last 
motorist causes all other road users. 
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2. Literature overview 
There is a considerable amount of literature on the effects of congestion pricing, also for the case of Oslo. The 
literature mainly studies the effects with numerical simulations and empirical logit models of a transport system (Grue 
et. al., 1997). We will rather use a theoretic model based on economic theory and see if the results are almost the same 
as in the econometric models. Arnott et al. (1993) make a detailed analysis of William Vickrey's bottleneck model of 
the congestion of cars during morning rush hour. Arnott et al.(1993) extended the model to treat price-sensitive 
demand, and in this paper it is extended to include public transport.  
The Institute of Transport Economics in Norway has performed calculations as part of the EU project MC-ICAM 
for the case of Oslo. The land-use and transport model RETRO is used to analyse the overall land use and transport 
effects that can be expected by gradual introduction and refinement of optimal road pricing in the Oslo area. The 
analyses show that it is optimal with more than triple the current toll during peak hours by 2015, while the optimal 
public transport tickets should be reduced from the current level. The optimal toll increases in 2015 as the satellite-
based road pricing is introduced. This will allow the taxing of queuing costs when they actually occur. 
The most studied question has been whether congestion charges will benefit the poor or the rich. Eliasson, J (2008) 
summarises this research in his paper. He finds from the Stockholm trial that men in high-income groups and residents 
in the central parts of the city will be affected the most: they will pay the most and often also reduce their car trips the 
most. 
3. Theoretical model  
The model is based on simplified assumptions, and requires a highly stylized transportation system. This is done 
so that the model would not be too extensive, and to provide a simplified picture of the congestion. In this situation, 
it is assumed that a given number of motorists will drive the same way and cross a bottleneck where a toll system is 
implemented. The bottleneck has a limited capacity. If the number of individuals exceeds the capacity of the bottleneck 
a queue will develop. All motorists will be homogeneous, i.e. they are all equal and have the same preferences. It is 
only a matter of private cars and there will be only one person in each car. All individuals are rational and will do 
what is best for them.  
 In reality it can often be possible to take other routes to avoid the bottleneck. This means that the model provides 
a narrow and fictitious picture of reality. How serious the consequences of such simplifications are is uncertain. It is 
not only the increased costs in reality that are not taken into account in the model. Vocational and service vehicles are 
big winners of the congestion charge (Alger et al (2007)), but these gains are excluded in the model. 
 The effects of a road price are evident. All individuals pay for the direct time costs and environmental costs they 
inflict on others by driving. In Oslo, there will be many intersections with congestion problems. However, the toll ring 
will not capture all motorists who travel by car to work. This means that some may create a queue without paying, 
while others do not cause a congestion problem but must pay. 
Every day N identical individuals travel to work. Each individual decides when it wants to leave home. The travel 
cost is a combination of the unit cost of coming too early for work, being late for work, travel time and road tolls. 
Statistics coincidence ensures that individuals do not leave together, since all are indifferent as to when they leave 
home. Assuming that the total travel time, T(t), is divided into fixed travel time, Tf, and variable travel time Tv(t) where 
t is the time the individual arrives at the bottleneck, the variable travel time will depend on how many cars that want 
to get through the bottleneck at the same time. Assuming further that fixed travel time is before the individual arrives 
at the bottleneck, once the individual is through the bottleneck, it arrives work.  
 
)()( tTTtT vf            (1) 
 
Variable travel time depends on queue length ( )(tD ) and the number of cars that can pass per unit time, ( s ). If 
the number of cars that arrive at the bottleneck exceeds s per unit of time, congestion will occur. Time in queue for 
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each individual is equal to the queue length at the time the individual arrives in the queue divided by the bottleneck 
capacity.  
 
s
tDtT v )()(            (2) 
The goal is to find an optimal congestion charge. Congestion is due to too many cars on the road simultaneously. 
Price adjustments may affect the individual's travel time. By registering when the queue starts and ends you find the 
time individuals leave home. The equilibrium price is a price where demand equals supply. For any price where 
demand is not equal to the supply, an economic agent has an interest in changing their behaviour. (Varian, s.219.) In 
equilibrium there is no desire to change behaviour. The number of individuals who leave at different times will provide 
an estimate on when congestion occurs. There are only a certain number of cars, s, through the bottleneck per unit 
time. There is no queue for the individual who leaves at 0t or 1t . The individual who travels at time t
~ arrives exactly 
on time at work, *t . By leaving at time t~ the individual is exposed only to the congestion cost.  Queue length increases 
from 0t  towards t
~ , where it gradually decreases until it disappears at 1t . Let )(tr be the departure rate function (from 
home). Then, 
 
 )(tD ³ 
t
t
ttsduur
0
)()( 0          (3) 
 
The price of a trip is the sum of private cost and toll : 
 
)()()( tQtCtp            (4) 
 
The private cost function is taken to be linear in travel time and schedule-delay (time early or time late for work) 
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Where D is the shadow cost of travel time, E  is the cost of arriving early at work, and J is the unit cost of arriving 
late. The individuals who come early at work are charged unit cost )]([ * tTtt vE . The iindividual who arrives at 
work on time, *t , traveling from the bottleneck at time , t~ , is charged the unit cost *)(~ ttTt v   . The individuals 
who come late for work are charged unit cost ])([ *ttTt v J . The first individual who arrives at work, travel from 
the intersection in time t0. The last individual who arrives at work, travel from the intersection at time t1. The 
individuals who leaves home first and last release queue, 0)()( 10   tTtT vv . They pay a cost by coming early or 
late for work. At time t~ the individual pay only the cost of standing in line, so that )~(~ * tTtt v   . The cost of the 
intervals between consists of a mix of standing in line and by coming early or late for work. In accordance with 
empirical results, Arnott et al (1993) estimated that .EDJ !!  It is shown later that it is natural for DE  (for 
example would (7) and (9) be negative if not), and no one would drive in the interval between 0t and t
~ . Moreover, it 
is natural that EJ ! , since it is worse to come too late at work than too early. The private costs are given to be linear 
in travel time, β and γ. The cost depends on the number of individuals in the interval, and queue length representing 
accumulation in previous intervals. 
The roads have limited capacity, and with too many motorists queuing occurs. By not pricing the good, we basically 
have great demand which leads to congestion. Below are the results without the congestion charge, ie Q(t)=0.Price 
per trip by driving early tt ~d , are as follows 
 
fvv TtTtttTtp DED  )(()()( *         (6) 
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The equilibrium price is a price where demand equals supply. For any price where demand is not equal to the offer, 
an economic agent has an interest in changing their behaviour. (Varian, p.219.) The equilibrium condition requires
0/  dtdp . In equilibrium there is no desire to change behaviour, so that the derivative of price with respect to time 
is zero. Transformation and the equilibrium condition provides 
 
ED
E
 dt
tdT v )(           (7) 
 
The number of individuals who leaves at different times, r (t), will provide an estimate on when the queue occurs. If 
the number of cars arriving at the bottleneck is greater than the capacity per unit time, s, there will be a queue 
 
str
dt
tdD  )()(           (8) 
(2), (7) and (8) gives the function of early departure 
ED
D
 
str )(           (9) 
The same procedure gives departure function from the bottleneck, r (t), for individuals who leave late. 
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D
 
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(2),(3), (9) and (10)  gives the variable travel costs.  
 
)()( 0tta
tT v  E
E  tt ~for    and  )()( 1 ttatT
v  J
J   tt ~for !    (11) 
 
Differentiation with respect to t gives the slope of the graph which is shown in (9) and (10).  Since the costs are equal 
for each individual,  
)()()( 01 tta
tt
a
tT v   E
E
J
J         (12) 
 
There are only a certain number of cars, s, through the bottleneck per unit time. If the number of cars exceeds s per 
unit of time a queue will develop. The length of the peak hours equals the number of individuals that pass through the 
intersection divided by the number of individuals who can pass the bottleneck per unit time, s. Length of the rush hour 
is N / s.  Congestion starts at 0t . The sum of the interval length gives the time when the interval ends 
 
s
Ntt  01            (13) 
 
By leaving at time t~ the individual is exposed only to the congestion cost, jf (5).  
 
tttT v ~)~( *            (14) 
94   Marie Aarestrup Aasness /  Transportation Research Procedia  1 ( 2014 )  89 – 100 
 
Only one interval is considered since the costs are equal. Equation (12),  (13) and (14) gives  two equations with two 
unknown.  By calculations and simplifying we find  
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Queue length increases from 0t   towards t
~ , where it gradually decreases until it disappears at 1t . A congestion charge 
may produce different effects. We now introduce a toll Q(t) that depends on when the individual passes the bottleneck. 
The toll varies throughout the day. The variable optimal congestion charge gives no queue. Departure in t~ remains the 
time the individual arrives precise at work, )~(~ * tTtt v . No queue allows individuals to travel later to be exactly 
on time, so that t~ changes with a congestion charge. The time it takes to get rid of the queue is the same as without a 
congestion charge. There are as many individuals to go through the bottleneck as before and after the congestion 
charge. The cost of going first and last is not affected by a congestion charge, 0)()( 10   tTtT vv . They pay a cost 
by coming early or late for work. At time t~  the individual pays only the cost of standing in line, so that )~(~ * tTtt v 
.  
  
Finding the optimal congestion charge must be based on cost per trip. The first case is the optimal toll before t~ . (4) 
and (5) gives price per trip before t~ .  
 
> @ )()()( * tQTTtttTtp Fvv  ED        (16) 
The equilibrium condition provides 0)('  tp  
)(')(')(')(' tQtTtTtp vv  EED         (17) 
E  )('0/)( tQfordttdT v         (18) 
To get time-variable costs to be zero so *~ tt  , marginal variable costs are selected equal E )(' tQ . Defines q as 
charge at departure 0t . 
)( 0tQq             (19) 
Currently, we consider the case where q = 0, so that 0t   and  1t  are not changed. Number of individuals is still 
exogenously given and does not depend on q. The optimal fee before t~ is 
)()( 0ttqtQ  E  for tt ~          (20) 
By the same procedure we find the optimal toll after t~  
)()( 1 ttqtQ  J  for tt ~!          (21) 
 Congestion charge regulates the number of individuals arriving at the bottleneck so that *~ tt  . Fig. 1 illustrates 
the cases with and without congestion charge. The dashed curve shows the case without congestion charging. The 
solid curve shows the result with an optimal congestion charge. Queue cost without congestion charge is equal to the 
congestion charge tolls.  Rush hour toll is the same for the first and last to leave, then apply )~()~( 10 tttt   JE . The 
fees are equal to each other when t goes to t~ . It provides )(lim)(lim)~( ~~ tQtQtQ tttt pn   . 
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Fig. 1: The bottleneck with and without congestion charge. 
By comparing marginal social costs with and without congestion charging shows the effect of a congestion charge. 
Costs without congestion charging are characterized by the fact that they do not include the external effects. The total 
variable cost (TVC) is the sum of total variable travel costs (TVTC), and travel costs by not getting on time to work, 
(SDC). The sum of TVC and fixed costs (TFC) gives the total cost (TC). A distinction is made between the costs of 
congestion charge and without the congestion charge. The costs incurred superscript O and E. These define, 
respectively, social optimum and no toll equilibrium. eTC  is total travel cost in equilibrium without toll, and oTC  are 
total travel costs in equilibrium with toll. Total fixed cost is fTND . Variable costs increase and decrease linearly. The 
cost depends on the departure. Previous calculations show that r (t) is constant. Average costs can be found by 
calculating the area to travel in the time interval from 0t  to t
~ , and the time interval from t~  to 1t . Toll in t
~ is 
representative of the maximum toll for the motorist. The average variable travel costs will be half of the maximum 
variable travel costs, )~(5,0 tT v due to linearity. Finds )~(tT v from (12) and (13 ) 
s
NtT v ¸¸¹
·
¨¨©
§
 JE
J
D
E)~(
         (22) 
Defines JE
EJG { . Multiply by D  to find the variable cost of travel time. TVTC are the variable costs at  travel 
time t~  multiplied by the number of individuals N. 
s
NNTVTCe
2
2
)( G           (23) 
 
The price of every individual is equal regardless of travel time. The cost of each individual consists of the time in 
queue, the cost of getting early / late for work or a mixture. This means that the similarity applies to any t value.  
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2
2
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          (24) 
The private costs are represented by the equation (5). From (5) it is known that in t
~
SDCe =0. Multiplies variables 
private travel costs by the number of individuals to get total variable travel costs.  
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NTVCe
2
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Without the congestion charge the price will be equal to private costs. 
ee Cp  .  
s
N
N
TCpe G              
The social marginal cost is obtained by differentiating the variable total costs (TVC) with respect to the number of 
individuals. Marginal social cost is without congestion charges (MSCe) 
 
s
N
N
TVCMSC
e
e G2 w
w          (26) 
Individuals adapt when others leave. Marginal social costs are designed after individuals have decided departure 
time. This means that the marginal social cost is independent of departure time. The cost of travel in time 0t  does not 
change with a congestion charge.  
 
s
NtSDCtSDC eo
2
00 2
)()( G          (27) 
Departure in t~ gives 0)~(  tSDCo . Cost by leaving in t~ and 0t are equal. Cost by leaving in t~ consist of congestion 
charge, toll. The toll equal )( 0tSDC
o . An optimal toll system makes no queue, and the variable travel costs are zero.  
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2
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s
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The price for consumers is the sum of private costs and road tolls. Private costs are represented only by the cost of not 
arriving early or late for work. Individuals without these costs impose a toll. The cost does not change with a 
congestion charge. Costs of leaving at 0t  and 1t  are equal. Costs of leaving at t
~ consist of congestion charge, toll. An 
optimal toll system makes no queue, and the variable travel costs are zero. Thus, the marginal cost with congestion 
charge (MSCo) is 
 
s
N
N
tTVCMSC
o
o G w
w )(          (29) 
The social marginal cost is reduced compared with the case without congestion charging. The roads are used more 
efficiently. The fee provides an additional income to the state that can be used to redistribute resources so that they 
are used more efficiently. Motorists pay the external cost. Individuals that leaves at 0t  or 1t  cause no external costs 
through queue. Individuals pay everything through the cost of not getting on time to work, a fee, or a mixture of the 
two. The fee represents the external cost. The external cost (EC) is equal to the marginal social cost.  
 
oMSCtQtSDCEC   )()(          (30) 
 
Marginal social costs are designed after individuals have decided departure time. This means that the marginal social 
cost is independent of departure time. An optimal toll provides no queue. The capacity per unit time, s, is equal to the 
number of individuals passing the bottleneck per unit time, r (t), when an optimal congestion charge is introduced. 
Congestion charge reduces the number of individuals arriving at the bottleneck simultaneously. Efficiency requires 
that each traveller will pay the marginal social cost. To achieve efficiency, the individual pay a fee equal )~(tQ . The 
individuals that come first or last in rush hour exposure to this cost through )()( 10 tSDCtSDC
oo  . The external cost 
is paid in either the disadvantage of not getting the correct time to work, congestion charge, or a mixture. Average toll 
must be equal to the average optimal travel cost in optimum. The equilibrium in the model is achieved when no driver 
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can reduce the driving costs per trip by changing the departure time. A variable congestion charge rates the external 
cost of congestion. If we introduce an environmental toll, the external costs of driving such as noise, accidents etc. are 
taken into account. It follows from an environmental toll that there is always a fixed toll, q> 0, in addition to a higher 
toll during peak hours. With a fixed toll, fixed costs increase, while the variable costs are as in the case above, with 
the congestion charge, and q = 0. Prices increase by a fixed constant. The price will be higher at the beginning and 
end of rush hour. Superscript m defines the equilibrium including environmental external costs.   
 
)()()( 000 tpqtptp
eom !          (31) 
 
External environmental costs also need to be considered. By pricing the external costs to the environment outside the 
bottleneck, the fixed toll must be greater than zero, q> 0. If individuals do not have any alternative to drive, the 
congestion charge will not affect the individual behaviour. Public transport is introduced in the model as an alternative 
to drive. N is a function of q. More expensive fixed toll gives fewer incentives to drive. The price of public transport, 
I , is exogenously given. Public transport is an alternative to motorists so that the congestion charge will have effect. 
Assuming that II  )(t  for all t. The assumption of homogeneous individuals means that the cost of using public 
transport is equal to the price of driving. The price of public transport is equal to the sum of the marginal social costs 
( oMSC ), fixed toll and fixed costs of driving a car.  
 IDG   fT
s
qNq )(          (32) 
The demand of driving a car is falling in the fixed charge q and increasing in the price of public transport. The demand 
for driving is endogenously given and depends on the charges, q.  
0),(  
dq
dNqNN           (33) 
The introduction of the toll will provide a pure Pareto improvement. Consumers were initially indifferent about 
when to leave, and still are. At the same time the system provides increased toll revenues to the state that can be spent 
on improvements for individuals. With this redistribution no one will get worse off, but some are better off. Define P
as the marginal environmental damage caused by driving. The product of the time in the car before individuals arrive 
at the bottleneck, the number of individuals who are driving and the marginal damage driving inflicts on the 
environment provides the external environmental cost, E. Differentiating the external environmental cost in terms of 
number of individuals gives the marginal social environmental costs of driving. 
PfNTE             (34) 
Differentiating the external environmental cost in terms of number of individuals gives the marginal social 
environmental costs by driving. The marginal cost shuld be equal to the environmental cost, q. 
 
qT
N
E f   w
w P           (35) 
When we price the marginal external environmental costs, individuals will be aware of the costs imposed on society 
in addition to the financial burden.   
4. Results for Oslo 
The results are only made for the morning rush hour. However, this simplification will illustrate the rush problem 
in Oslo, since the elasticity is low with respect to departure time and afternoon rush hours will be approximately the 
same as the morning rush hour. Toll consistent with the model can be estimated by estimating the external costs of 
driving. External environmental costs of driving are estimated in the NOU 2007:8. Convert the costs from the NOU 
report to emissions per passage in the toll ring, to find the optimal variable charges (Q (t)) and the fixed charge (q) in 
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the paper.  NOU 2007:8 operates with a fixed cost over time, while this paper is considering a variable fee over time. 
Assume that the estimated numbers are the average cost of emissions. Average cost of emissions is equivalent to the 
average toll. The external marginal cost from gasoline-powered passenger cars is on average somewhat higher than 
the gasoline toll. For diesel-powered passenger cars and lorries, the average external marginal costs are substantially 
higher than the diesel fuel toll. What type of fuel that causes the least harm is uncertain. Norwegian Pollution Control 
Authority (SFT) shows that new diesel cars are preferable to new petrol cars. This does not correspond with the tables 
from the NOU report. SFT has compared the environmental and health disadvantages from CO2 and NO2 emissions. 
Petrol cars emit 25 % more than the equivalent diesel cars. Nevertheless, the calculation from SFT shows that local 
emissions from diesel cars are higher than from petrol cars. (SFT, 22/9-2008). The calculations below are based on 
the NOU 2007:8.  
Table1  Fixed charge, q: external marginal cost except congestion of passenger cars (NOK per litre of fuel). Source: NOU 2007:8 
 Local emissions Noise Accidents Wear and Tear Total 
 petroleum gas diesel 
petroleum 
gas diesel 
petroleum 
gas diesel 
petroleum 
gas diesel 
petroleum 
gas diesel 
Cities 0,62 6,42 2,98 4,44 2,02 3,01 0,01 0,02 5,63 13,89 
Sparsely 
populated areas 0,25 0,12 0 0 3,22 3,56 0,02 0,02 3,49 3,7 
specific costs in 
city 0 6,3 0 4,44 0 -0,55 0 0 0 10,19 
q 0,37 4,25 2,98 2,99 -1,1 -0,37 -0,01 0 2,14 6,98 
 
Local emissions from cars with diesel engines are much higher than petrol cars in cities. It is assumed in these 
calculations that when diesel cars use a little less than one litre of diesel per trip, petrol cars use one litre of petrol per 
trip. External marginal cost of diesel passenger cars is less than in the NOU, and is divided by external marginal cost 
of petrol cars, which gives .48,1
85,10
09,16   V  Diesel costs in the rest of this paper is divided byV .  
The difference between cities and rural areas gives the fixed charge, q. This provides the unique costs of driving 
cars in the city. Other costs and emissions will be covered by the fuel price. Estimate toll that is equal for both diesel 
cars and petrol cars. Data from Norwegian Public Roads Administration show how many cars there are in Oslo. The 
results give 22 % of diesel cars and 78 % gasoline cars in Oslo. The weighted fixed cost, q, gives q= 
0,22*6,87+0,78*2,14= 3,18. Assume first that one car uses one litre of gasoline per trip. The calculations are based 
on how many litres of fuel per trip to take into account external marginal costs like local emissions, see table 1.  From 
the tables in NOU 2007:8 we find the average congestion cost for petrol cars to be 10, 85, and for diesel cars to be 16, 
09. Average congestion cost, k, for a car will be 85 10,=22 0,*8)(16,09/1,4 + 78 0,*85 10,=k .The cost at time t~  
consists only of the congestion charge, and provides maximum toll. )~(tQ = 71,212*85,10  .  Based on the theoretic 
model from chapter 3, it is assumed that 8:10 is the moment you arrive on time for work and that rush hour lasts from 
06:30 until 09:00. Then the slope of the curve will be around 0,2 and 0,4.When we introduce a fixed charge (q> 0), 
plus a variable fee system throughout the day. The results gives a maximum toll equals NOK 24,89. If we assume that 
per trip the car uses two litres of gasoline, the maximum toll will be NOK 49.78. The estimated external costs for 
petrol cars and diesel cars are different. 
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Fig. 2: Congestion charge example for Oslo when the cars uses two liter of fuel per trip. 
Perhaps it is optimal to have different toll for various fuel. Today's fuel prices are more similar, but there has long 
been a relatively large difference. If we separate the two cases the results per trip when the car uses one litre gives a 
maximum toll for petrol cars equal NOK 23.84 while the maximum toll for diesel cars is 28.57 NOK. If we assume 
that the cars uses two litre per trip the maximum toll for petrol cars is NOK 47.68 and for diesel cars it is NOK 57.14. 
The benefit of separating charges for petrol cars and diesel cars is not very large. The distinction between the fixed 
costs is still quite large if an average car uses two litres of gasoline per trip. Then the current charges are far below the 
real costs at peak times.      
5. Interaction of congestion and environmental external costs 
If we compare the model used in this paper with other models of road pricing, peculiar effects of the model can be 
observed. Johansson-Stenman (2006) looks at the interaction between congestion and environmental external costs, 
while Arnott et al (1993) look mainly at the external environmental cost of queuing.  
Johansson-Stenman (2006) finds the optimal road price to depend on five factors. The first is the marginal time 
cost each individual causes other individuals. The second factor reflects others' increased private costs per kilometre 
by standing in line. The third factor reflects the marginal damage of pollution from each vehicle per distance unit. The 
fourth factor reflects the fact that each car will pollute more for each additional kilometre they drive in line. The fifth 
factor will in the same way as the fourth represent the increased congestion on the roads. The effects are reduced 
speed, damage the local population is exposed to by pollution, and that every car releases more emissions with 
congestion.  
In Arnott et al (1993) the problem of congestion and additional pollution will not occur, since the optimal toll does 
not provide a queue. Factors one, two, four and five are already taken into account by introducing the optimal toll. 
Marginal pollution from every car per distance unit represents external costs other than congestion. Factor three in 
Johansson-Stenman (2006) is covered in the present model through the fixed cost, q>0.  
6. Conclusions 
The findings show that transforming the current toll-ring system into a congestion pricing system where peak traffic 
is charged a higher toll than off-peak traffic holds great potential for easing traffic congestion and improving the 
environment. Further, it will improve the efficiency of both public and private transport while at the same time it can 
raise more revenues when compared to the current situation. Thus, such a move will not be in conflict with the current 
road financing toll. These results have direct policy implications in that they should appeal to decision-makers and 
hence are relevant for the marketing of congestion pricing. 
In practice, there will probably always be some congestion in Oslo, but congestion charging can provide much less 
congestion in Oslo. In my opinion, such a model can be improved in a number of relevant ways. In particular, we 
could assume heterogeneous individuals instead of homogeneous individuals. A practical model can be implemented 
fairly quickly. It is not necessary to use another 45 years after William Vickrey introduced the basic idea of congestion 
charging in 1963. 
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The mathematical model of the congestion charge in Oslo is very relevant to environmental economics. Optimal 
use means higher prices in the toll ring in Oslo around 8 a.m. and around 4 p.m. Congestion charge provides time-
gains and environmental benefits. These gains are represented by the variable charges that are introduced during rush 
hours. There are environmental costs other than queue. Environmental costs are represented by the fixed fee in the 
model. The results show that the fixed fee is very low compared to the congestion fee. This suggests that the congestion 
imposed on society gives greater external costs than the environmental cost except queue. 
The results suggest that the most important thing is to introduce a variable congestion charge. Outside rush hours 
it is reasonable to lower the price. The paper is based on figures for external costs of driving, and it is difficult to see 
what would change the conclusion given the figures from the Ministry of Finance.  
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